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 Hume on Responsibility and Punishment
 PAUL RUSSELL
 University of British Columbia
 Vancouver, BC
 Canada V6T 1W5
 In this paper I pursue two closely related objectives. First, I articulate
 and describe the nature and character of Hume's theory of punishment.
 Second, in light of this account, I offer an assessment of the contem-
 porary interest and value of Hume's theory. Throughout my discus-
 sion I emphasize the relevance and importance of Hume's views on
 moral responsibility to his account of punishment.1 More specifically,
 I argue that Hume seeks to develop an account of punishment on the
 foundation of a naturalistic theory of responsibility - that is, a theory
 which draws our attention to the role of moral sentiment in this sphere.2
 Although this naturalistic aspect of Hume's theory of punishment has
 been largely overlooked by commentators, I maintain that it is,
 nevertheless, precisely this aspect of Hume's theory that is especially
 interesting from a contemporary perspective.
 1 My concern with Hume's theory of responsibility in this context will be largely
 subservient to my primary concern which is Hume's general theory of punish-
 ment. I will not, accordingly, provide any detailed analysis of Hume's theory of
 responsibility. For a more detailed account of Hume's views on responsibility see
 my 'On the Naturalism of Hume's "Reconciling Project"/ Mind 92 (1983), 593-600.
 Of related interest see also 'Causation, Compulsion and Compatibilism,' Ameri-
 can Philosophical Quarterly 25 (1988), 313- 21.
 2 There are, in general, two closely related elements involved in Hume's natural-
 ism. The first is that which concerns Hume's project of 'science of man' (i.e. his
 empirical, scientific investigation into the principles of human nature). The sec-
 ond is that which concerns Hume's emphasis on the role of feeling in human
 life. Both these elements constitute major themes in Hume's philosophy and, as
 I will show, they both play an important role in shaping Hume's approach to
 the problem of punishment. On Hume's naturalism in general see, e.g., Barry
 Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1977), esp. Chs. 1 and 10. See
 also P. F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties (London: Methuen
 1983), esp. Ch. 1, sect.3.
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 I
 It would seem reasonable to assume that if Hume does have a clear
 position on the subject of punishment then it most likely is to be found
 in his major works the Treatise and the Enquiries.3 When we turn to
 these works, however, we find that what Hume has to say on this sub-
 ject is both fragmented and cursory.4 His brief remarks on this issue
 largely emphasize the social utility of punishment. Punishment, he
 claims, is justified primarily on the ground that it motivates men to
 obey those rules of justice which are essential to 'the peace and securi-
 ty of human society.'5 Clearly, then, punishment must be justified, at
 least in part, in terms of a 'forward-looking' rationale. Given this, it
 would seem safe to conclude that Hume unambiguously rejects pure
 retributivism. That is, punishment cannot, on this account, be justi-
 fied simply on the basis of guilt or wrongdoing, without any reference
 to consequentialist considerations.
 This general interpretation of Hume's position on punishment cer-
 tainly accords with the views of Hobbes and Schlick - two thinkers
 with whom Hume is closely associated in this context. More specifi-
 cally, like Hume, Hobbes and Schlick are primarily concerned to em-
 phasize the social utility of punishment. Both argue that punishment
 without any view to reform or deterrence is simply an act of 'hostility'
 3 References will be to the Selby-Bigge edition of Hume's Treatise of Human Nature,
 revised by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1978); to the Selby-
 Bigge edition of the Enquiries, also revised by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford
 University Press 1975); and also to Essays Moral, Political and Literary, T.H. Green
 and T.H. Grosse, eds., 2 vols. (London: Longmans 1875). The Treatise is abbreviat-
 ed as THN; the first and second Enquiries are abbreviated as EHU and EPM
 respectively.
 4 See, e.g., THN, 410: Tis indeed certain...'; EHU, 97-8: 'All laws being found-
 ed...'; THN, 609: 'Men have observ'd...'; EPM, 187: 'When any man....' It is an
 interesting question why Hume has relatively little to say on the subject of punish-
 ment. Suffice it to say, however, that for Hume, it would seem, it is the sense
 of honour and shame (i.e., pride or humility) that attaches to virtue and vice,
 rather than the prospect of reward or punishment, which is the principal motive
 to virtue. In other words, it is how we feel about ourselves, rather than our be-
 liefs regarding how others will treat us, which is the sure path to virtue.
 5 Cf. THN, II, 2, esp. sect. 7. Some commentators, probably with these passages
 in mind, interpret Hume's views on punishment as being fundamentally utilitar-
 ian in nature and thus 'as necessitating the rejection of desert' (John Kleinig, Punish-
 ment and Desert [The Hague: Nijhoff 1973], 49). By and large, however,
 commentators on Hume's philosophy have little or nothing to say on this sub-
 ject. We find, in other words, that the thinness of Hume's remarks on this sub-
 ject is reflected in the relevant secondary literature.
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 or Vengeance.'6 It is important to note, however, that Hobbes's the-
 ory of punishment is not purely utilitarian in nature. According to
 Hobbes, punishment is, by definition, for a 'transgression of the law'
 and thus (necessarily) has a retributive element. Although Schlick's
 remarks are less clear on this point it would seem that he is willing
 to dispense with all retributive elements from punishment. To the ex-
 tent that Hume's views are identified with those of Schlick, therefore,
 he would appear to be committed to a (purely) utilitarian theory of
 punishment.
 There is, beyond these specific considerations, a more general ex-
 planation for why Hume is associated with Hobbes and Schlick on this
 subject. Hume is widely regarded as a major spokesman for the
 empiricist-compatibilist position in the free will dispute.7 As such, he
 is viewed as a key figure in a tradition that stretches from Hobbes to
 Schlick.8 Although Hume's remarks on the subject of punishment are
 rather slight, both Hobbes and Schlick do indicate, in some detail, the
 relevance of their views on free will to the problem of punishment.9
 In light of the supposed parallels between Hume and Hobbes and Schlick
 6 See, in particular, Hobbes's Leviathan, C.B. MacPherson, ed. (Harmonds worth:
 Penguin 1968 [1651]), Ch. 28; Schlick, 'When is a Man Responsible?/ reprinted
 in B. Berofsky, ed., Free Will and Determinism (New York: Harper & Row 1966), 60.
 7 That is to say, most philosophers would accept John Mackie's claim that Hume
 articulates the 'classic defence of compatibilism' (J.L. Mackie, Ethics [Harmonds-
 worth: Penguin 1977], 245). Hume's discussion of the free will problem appears
 at THN, 11,3,1-2 and EHU, Sect. 8. For a standard or orthodox interpretation on
 Hume's views on free will see, for example, Barry Stroud, Hume, ch.7.
 8 Thus Isaiah Berlin, for example, speaks of the 'Hobbes-Hume-Schlick doctrine':
 Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1969), xv. Similarly, Jona-
 than Glover argues that 'almost identical versions of this doctrine [sc. com-
 patibilism] are to be found in Hobbes, Hume, Mill, Russell, Schlick and Ayer':
 Responsibility (London Routledge & Kegan Paul 1970), 50n.
 9 Hobbes, 'Of Liberty and Necessity/ selections reprinted in D.D. Raphael, ed., Brit-
 ish Moralists: 1650-1800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1969), 63-5; Schlick,
 'When is a Man Responsible?,' 59-61. The fundamental point which both Hobbes
 and Schlick are concerned to make in this context is that rewards and punish-
 ments serve to cause people to act in some ways rather than others and are, hence,
 of considerable social utility (cf. Hume, T,410). Schlick goes so far as to analyse
 responsibility in these terms. That is to say, on his account the issue of responsi-
 bility is to be interpreted in terms of the question regarding who it is of utility
 for us to punish (60). (A similar 'pragmatic' or 'forward-looking' approach is pur-
 sued in P. Nowell-Smith, 'Freewill and Moral Responsibility,' Mind 57 [1948], 45-61;
 and J.J.C. Smart, 'Free Will, Praise and Blame,' reprinted in G. Dworkin, ed.,
 Determinism, Free Will and Moral Responsibility [Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
 1970], 208-13.)
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 on the subject of free will it seems reasonable, on the face of it, to in-
 terpret Hume's position on punishment as being, roughly, that of his
 like-minded colleagues in the empiricist-compatibilist tradition. In other
 words, from this general perspective we are encouraged to view
 Hume's account of punishment as being, essentially, utilitarian in na-
 ture.10
 While there is, evidently, a strong utilitarian element in Hume's ac-
 count of punishment, it seems equally clear that his remarks on this
 subject are not unequivocally utilitarian in nature. Moreover, it may
 be argued that there are several passages in the Treatise which lend
 support to an account of punishment that is essentially retributivist,
 rather than utilitarian, in nature. Hume suggests, for example, that
 in regard to divine laws, God may act not only in his 'magisterial ca-
 pacity,' with a view to producing obedience, but also 'as the avenger
 of crimes merely on account of their odiousness and deformity' (T, 410-11,
 my emphasis). In several other passages Hume further suggests that
 we are naturally or psychologically disposed to retributive attitudes
 and practices. More specifically, he argues that our moral sentiments
 (qua calm forms of love and hate) naturally give rise to 'benevolence
 or anger; that is, with a desire of making happy the person we love,
 and miserable the person we hate' (T, 591). n In this way, we find that
 Hume's remarks in the Treatise and Enquiries lend some support to both
 (backward-looking) retributivist and (forward-looking) utilitarian in-
 terpretations. Nor is it clear how these divergent elements of his ac-
 count of punishment are supposed to merge together into one unified
 theory. These tensions in Hume's position have led some commenta-
 tors to conclude that 'it is not easy to say where Hume stood' on this
 issue.12 A more severe critic might argue that Hume simply oscillates
 between utilitarian and retributivist views on punishment and he has,
 therefore, no clear position for us to articulate. In order to resolve this
 10 I have argued elsewhere that this general perspective on Hume on free will is,
 in important respects, mistaken. (See the papers referred to in note 1.) In this
 paper I show that this mistaken perspective on Hume leads directly to confusion
 about his views on punishment.
 11 See, more generally, THN, II, 2, 6. 1 follow Pall Ardal in thinking that Hume holds
 that the moral sentiments are calm forms of love and hatred. See his Passion and
 Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1966), Ch. 6. Other
 relevant passages can be found at T,348, 418 and 439; EPM,302 and also Essays,
 Vol. 2, 139.
 12 D.D. Raphael, 'Hume and Adam Smith on Justice and Utility /Proceedings of the
 Aristotelian Society 73 (1973), 99; reprinted in Justice and Liberty (London: Athlone
 1980).
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 problem we must, I suggest, look elsewhere in the corpus of Hume's
 writings.
 It is, perhaps, surprising to find that Hume's most coherent remarks
 on the subject of punishment appear in his posthumously published
 essay 'Of the Immortality of the Soul.'13 In the second section of that
 essay Hume turns his attention to the 'moral arguments' which are
 supposed to prove the immortality of the soul. These arguments, he
 notes, are 'chiefly those derived from the justice of God, which is sup-
 posed to be further interested in the further punishment of the vicious
 and reward of the virtuous.' In this context Hume is especially con-
 cerned to argue that responsibility and punishment can be understood
 only within the fabric of human nature and human society. To this
 end Hume launches a number of arguments against the orthodox the-
 ological position. For our purposes the following points are the most
 important.
 1. Hume maintains that the distribution of rewards and punishments
 is determined on the basis of our (human) moral sentiments. He writes:
 By what rule are punishments and rewards distributed? What is the Divine stan-
 dard of merit and demerit? Shall we suppose that human sentiments have place
 in the Deity? How bold that hypothesis!... To suppose measures of approbation
 and blame different from the human confounds everything. Whence do we learn
 that there is such a thing as moral distinctions, but from our own sentiments? (402)
 In 1740, in a letter to Francis Hutcheson, Hume touches on the same
 point. He states: '... since Morality, according to your Opinion as well
 as mine, is determin'd merely by Sentiment, it regards only human
 Nature and human Life. This has often been urg'd against you, & the
 Consequences are very momentous. . . .If Morality were determined by
 Reason, that is the same to all rational Beings: But nothing but ex-
 perience can assure us, that Sentiments are the same. What Experience
 have we with regard to superior Beings? How can we ascribe to them
 any sentiments at all?'14
 In this way, Hume is arguing that the moral sentiments serve as the
 foundation upon which we distribute rewards and punishments. Given
 that we have no knowledge of God's sentiments - or even if He has
 any sentiments - it is quite impossible for us to make any sense of
 13 Essays, Vol. 2, 399-406
 14 Hume repeatedly points out the difficulties involved in attributing human pas-
 sions or sentiments to God: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, N.K. Smith,
 ed., 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Nelson 1947), 156, 212, 226.
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 the basis upon which God is supposed to distribute rewards and
 punishments in a future state.
 2. Hume argues that the point or purpose of punishment is that it se-
 cures or produces benefits for human society. He writes:
 Punishment, without any proper end or purpose, is inconsistent with our ideas
 of goodness and justice; and no end can be served by it after the whole scene
 [sc. this world] is closed. ...What man, who has not met with personal provoca-
 tion (or what good-natufd man who has), could inflict on crimes, from the sense
 of blame alone, even the common, legal, frivolous punishments? And does any-
 thing steel the breast of judges and juries against the sentiments of humanity
 but reflections on necessity and public interest? (402; Hume's emphasis)
 In other words, Hume maintains that a future state in which the wick-
 ed are punished would serve no end or purpose and thus would lack
 any proper or appropriate justification.15 The only proper end or pur-
 pose of punishment, he holds, is that it serves the interests of human
 society.
 3. Hume points out that punishment must not be disproportionate to
 the offence:
 Punishment, according to our conception, should bear some proportion to the
 offence. Why then eternal punishment for the temporary offences of so frail a
 creature as man? ...The chief source of moral ideas is the reflection on the in-
 terests of human society. Ought these interests, so short, so frivolous, to be guard-
 ed by punishments, eternal and infinite? The damnation of one man is an infinitely
 greater evil in the universe, than the subversion of a thousand millions of king-
 doms. (402-3; Hume's emphasis)
 Clearly, then, Hume is concerned to show that Divine punishment,
 being 'infinite and eternal/ is bound to be grossly disproportionate even
 when inflicted upon the worst of criminals.
 In this way, Hume launches what is essentially a two-pronged at-
 tack on the theological position. First, given that we have no evidence
 15 Of course, this is a separate issue from the question concerning the utility of (reli-
 gious) belief in the existence of such a future state. That is to say, as Hume recog-
 nized, many would claim that we have utilitarian reasons to promote and
 encourage belief in the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. In reply to
 this (distinct) claim Hume maintains that beliefs of this general nature are, at best,
 of little social utility and that they in fact tend to undermine our natural human
 commitment to morality and the laws of society (D, 219-24; see also THN, 113-15;
 EHU, 147).
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 of the nature or existence of God's sentiments, there is no accounting
 for the basis upon which we can be responsible to Him and, there-
 fore, there is no accounting for the basis upon which He distributes
 rewards and punishments. Second, in so far as we suppose God to
 distribute eternal punishments to those He disapproves of, such Di-
 vine punishment: (a) lacks any point or purpose since it produces no
 benefits for human society; and (b) given that it is infinite in duration,
 it will inevitably be excessive in the extreme. It would seem to follow,
 therefore, that according to Hume the theological doctrine of eternal
 rewards and punishments in a future life is from one point of view
 unintelligible, and, from another, morally repugnant.
 Given this more elaborate statement of Hume's views on punish-
 ment how should we characterize the general nature of his position?
 There are, I believe, two features of Hume's discussion which merit
 particular attention. These are: (a) his 'mixed' or teleological retributivist
 account of punishment; and (b) the 'naturalistic' theory of responsibil-
 ity which serves as the foundation of his teleological retributivism. I
 will begin by describing in more detail the nature of Hume's teleologi-
 cal retributivism.
 Our analysis of Hume's remarks on punishment suggest that we
 must approach this issue by way of distinguishing several different
 questions, each of which requires, on Hume's account, a different an-
 swer.16 More specifically, there are at least two significantly different
 questions which Hume appears to be addressing himself to in this con-
 text. The first asks: What is the end or purpose of punishment? In other
 words, what is the general justifying aim of punishment considered
 as an institution or practice? The second asks: On what basis are
 punishments to be distributed? That is, who may be punished (i.e. who
 is liable to punishment) and how severely may we punish them (i.e.
 what amount of punishment are they liable to)? Hume, as I have noted,
 provides us with different answers to these different questions. Ac-
 cording to his account, therefore, it is a mistake to assume that the
 justification of punishment involves an appeal to a single value or aim
 (e.g. deterrence, retribution, reform, etc.). In addressing ourselves to
 the issue of the general justifying aim, for example, we must appeal
 to considerations of social utility (i.e. deterrence and reform). Such
 (forward-looking) considerations, however, are not relevant or appro-
 priate when we turn to the question of the distribution of punishment
 16 My approach here draws heavily on H.L.A. Hart's influential statement of the
 teleological retributivist (i.e. 'mixed' or 'reconciliationist') theory of punishment
 in 'Prologomenon to the Principles of Punishment/ reprinted in Punishment and
 Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1968), 1-27.
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 (i.e. liability and amount). Here we must take note of (backward-
 looking) retributivist considerations. Considerations of this nature,
 Hume suggests, must be interpreted in terms of our moral sentiments.
 The moral sentiments, it is claimed, provide us with a framework
 within which it may be determined who deserves to be punished and
 who does not. That is, according to this account, there is an intimate
 connection between the question of whether or not we deem some-
 one liable to punishment and the question of whether or not that per-
 son arouses the appropriate negative moral sentiments in us. Someone
 who does not arouse such sentiments in us when we contemplate his
 actions or character cannot be justly punished even if the infliction of
 punishment would, all things considered, produce beneficial conse-
 quences. In other words, it is a necessary condition of being justly
 punished that you are also justly disapproved of or blamed. Further,
 the degree to which a person whom we disapprove of is liable to punish-
 ment will clearly be limited by the degree to which we disapprove or
 blame him (i.e. the amount of punishment must not be out of propor-
 tion to the strength of our disapproval).17 In this way, we find that
 our moral sentiments account for the principles which govern and limit
 the distribution of punishment.
 Hume maintains that punishment is justified only if it serves the pub-
 lic interest. It would seem to follow, therefore, that where punishment
 does not serve the public interest it cannot be justified even if it is
 deserved. That is to say, from the fact that someone arouses negative
 moral sentiments in us it does not straightforwardly follow that we
 are justified in punishing him. It follows only that he is liable to the
 appropriate degree of punishment. On this account, then, the question
 of whether or not the man deserves to be punished should be kept dis-
 tinct from the question of whether or not the infliction of punishment
 would produce some beneficial consequences.18 It is, accordingly, es-
 pecially important to note that on this view the general justifying aim
 of punishment cannot be accounted for simply in terms of our nega-
 tive moral sentiments towards the individual(s) concerned. While our
 moral sentiments may serve as an adequate basis upon which to ac-
 count for the distribution of punishment, they do not, of themselves,
 17 Cf. THN, 348: 'Nothing is more evident ....'
 18 Hume's position on this issue may be contrasted with Austin Duncan-Jones's ac-
 count of Butler's position. He reports Butler as taking the view that the notion
 of desert suggests 'both that a man's conduct is bad and that to penalize him is
 useful, or both that his conduct is good and to praise or reward him is useful'
 (Butler's Moral Philosophy [Harmonds worth: Penguin 1952, 140; my emphasis]).
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 provide us with any adequate account of the purpose or point of punish-
 ment. It would be a mistake, in other words, to attempt to justify the
 practice of punishment by referring solely to our (negative) moral sen-
 timents without making any reference to the utility of such a practice.
 To this extent Hume's theory is not committed to, and does not license,
 any crude form of retributivism. Should we find, for example, that the
 institution or practice of punishment lacks any satisfactory teleologi-
 cal rationale (i.e. it is of no social utility) then Hume may consistently
 maintain that such an institution or practice should be suspended or
 abandoned altogether.
 Hume's position on this issue may be further clarified by way of dis-
 tinguishing between two very different modes of retributivism. That
 is to say, it is crucial that we distinguish between 'negative retributi-
 vism,' the doctrine that we must not punish the innocent (nor exces-
 sively punish the guilty), and 'positive retributivism/ the doctrine that
 we have an obligation to punish the guilty. Our moral sentiments to-
 wards an individual do not, of themselves, generate an obligation to
 punish that individual. That is to say, as I have noted, it does not fol-
 low from the fact that an individual deserves to be punished that we
 are, necessarily, justified in punishing him (as such punishment may
 be of no social utility). Hume's theory, therefore, does not lend any
 support to 'positive retributivism.' It does, however, account for the
 'negative' retributive principle which is essential to the teleological
 retributivist position. That is, our moral sentiments, by way of deter-
 mining the distribution of punishment, ensure that the innocent must
 not be punished, nor the guilty excessively punished. Similarly, on
 the other side of the same coin, our moral sentiments also enable us
 to determine who we are permitted to punish (i.e. who is liable to
 punishment). In this way, the moral sentiments provide what may be
 described as the 'negative' rationale of punishment. They indicate the
 limits within which the attitudes and practices associated with punish-
 ment must take place. Theories and systems of punishment which try
 to ignore the limits imposed by moral sentiments are, on this account,
 fundamentally flawed. The framework which the moral sentiments im-
 pose upon any system of punishment cannot be ignored because this
 framework constitutes the very foundation upon which any adequate
 or plausible theory of punishment must be erected.
 It is widely held that Hume's theory of justice is a form of rule-
 utilitarianism. It should be clear, however, that as regards punish-
 ment Hume's position is more complex than this. In particular, as I
 have emphasized, the principles governing the distribution of punish-
 ment reflect considerations of desert, interpreted in terms of moral sen-
 timent, rather than those of utility. In this regard, the obvious point
 of comparison is John Rawls's well-known rule-utilitarian approach to
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 punishment.19 According to this account, no rule or practice permit-
 ting punishment of the innocent (i.e. 'telishment') is likely to have any
 utilitarian justification. In this way, for the rule utilitarian it is consider-
 ations of social utility which are the ground of our prohibition against
 punishing the innocent. We misrepresent Hume's analysis of the
 retributive element of punishment if we interpret him along these lines.
 Moral sentiment, evidently, plays a central role in Hume's account
 of punishment. This is indicative of the more general point that Hume
 is committed to a naturalistic account of moral responsibility.20 One
 of the objectives of Hume's 'science of man' was to describe the circum-
 stances in which men are felt to be responsible. This description is given
 largely in terms of Hume's associationist psychology and the mecha-
 nism of the indirect passions - the moral sentiments being understood
 as calm forms of love and hatred. The details of this account do not
 concern us in this context. The crucial point is that, for Hume, respon-
 sibility must be understood in terms of our natural psychological reac-
 tions to the moral qualities and character traits of our fellow human
 beings. We find that the actions and character traits of other people
 inevitably generate emotional responses and reactions in us (i.e. moral
 sentiments).21 Clearly, then, on this account, responsibility must be
 viewed as part-and-parcel of our emotional make-up and, as such, a
 'given' of our human nature.22 According to this view, therefore, a prop-
 er understanding of the nature and circumstances of responsibility re-
 quires that we develop a clearer understanding of the role that moral
 sentiment plays in human life.23
 19 John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules/ reprinted in P. Foot, ed., Theories of Ethics
 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1967), 144-70
 20 A naturalistic interpretation of Hume's views on responsibility is defended in my
 'On the Naturalism of Hume's "Reconciling Project".' A more detailed account
 of Hume's description of the 'mechanism of responsibility' is provided in that
 paper.
 21 In this way, while we may, on Hume's account, suspend or abandon the institu-
 tion or practice of punishment, there is no question of us abandoning or suspend-
 ing the whole framework of the moral sentiments.
 22 See T,474: 'These sentiments are so rooted in our constitution and temper...';
 EPM,273: 'But the sentiments of humanity...'; EPM,322: 'Every one may employ
 terms in what sense he pleases....'
 23 Hume's views regarding the relevance of freedom to ascriptions of responsibility
 must be understood within this framework. When an agent acts according to the
 determination of his will (i.e. when he enjoys 'liberty of spontaneity') it is possi-
 ble for us to infer his character from his action. In these circumstances our moral
 sentiments are naturally aroused. By contrast, where and when an agent is
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 It is this naturalistic account of responsibility which, according to
 Hume, must serve as the foundation of any adequate theory of punish-
 ment. In particular, it is essential, on this account, that we interpret
 the retributive features of punishment in terms of our moral sentiments.
 This important feature of Hume's discussion of punishment (i.e. his
 concern with the moral sentiments) is entirely absent from Hobbes's
 and Schlick's discussions. To this extent, therefore, it seems evident
 that Hume develops his theory along fundamentally different lines
 from those pursued by Hobbes and Schlick.24 Moreover, whatever ob-
 jections Hume's theory is vulnerable to, it is not vulnerable to the stan-
 dard objection levelled against purely utilitarian theories: namely, that
 they license the punishment of the innocent or the excessive punish-
 ment of the guilty. Suffice it to note that Schlick's account is widely
 thought to be vulnerable on precisely this point.25
 II
 Hume has not been alone in his efforts to construct a theory of punish-
 ment on the basis of naturalistic foundations. On the contrary, Hume's
 friend and fellow Scot, Adam Smith, developed a theory of punish-
 ment along very similar lines. Indeed, on the face of it, Smith's posi-
 tion is very close to that of Hume's, in so far as he too is concerned
 to describe the moral psychology on which our practices of reward and
 punishment rest.26 In light of this, it may be suggested that Hume's
 subject to external force or violence (i.e. lacks liberty of spontaneity) or his ac-
 tions are due to 'indifference' (i.e. are uncaused) it is impossible for us to infer
 his character from his action. It is, according to Hume, a matter of psychological
 fact that in these circumstances no moral sentiment would be aroused in us and,
 hence, the agent would not be regarded as responsible.
 24 In light of these observations it may be argued that in so far as Hume's views
 on punishment have been misunderstood and misrepresented the root difficulty
 lies with confusion about his views on responsibility. More specifically, the gener-
 al tendency to place Hume squarely in the empiricist-compatibilist tradition, along-
 side Hobbes and Schlick, has led commentators to overlook Hume's concern with
 the role of moral sentiment in this sphere. Clearly, as our analysis reveals, with-
 out an adequate interpretation of Hume's views on responsibility it is impossible
 to develop a proper understanding of his position on punishment.
 25 See, e.g., C.A. Campbell's objections to 'Schlick's essentially "forward looking"
 interpretation of punishment and responsibility': Is "Freewill" a Pseudo-Problem?,'
 reprinted in Berofsky, Free Will and Determinism, 112-18.
 26 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, eds. (Ox-
 ford: Oxford University Press 1976); abbreviated as TMS. Also relevant is Smith,
 Lectures on Jurisprudence, R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, and P.G. Stern, eds. (Oxford:
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 theory of punishment is best understood as being simply an (under-
 developed) variant of the sort of (naturalistic) theory that Smith
 describes. Such an interpretation, however, would be mistaken. The
 differences between Hume's and Smith's theories are at least as in-
 structive as their similarities.
 According to Smith, we regard punishment as just and deserved in
 those circumstances where an impartial spectator would sympathize
 with (i.e. share) the resentment felt by the injured party.27 More pre-
 cisely, an action deserves punishment when 'it appears to be the proper
 object of resentment' (TMS, 67). It is the sentiment of resentment 'which
 most immediately and directly prompts us to punish.' To punish, Smith
 maintains, is simply 'to return evil for evil that has been done' (TMS,
 68). In this way, we find that an offender is deemed 'the proper object
 of punishment, when we thus entirely sympathize with, and thereby
 approve of, that sentiment which prompts us to punish' (TMS, 74).
 In other words, Smith claims that in 'going along' with the sentiment
 of resentment from which the action of punishment 'proceeds,' we
 must necessarily approve of the punishment, and regard the person
 against whom it is directed as its proper and suitable object.
 Smith's retributivism is in no way half-hearted. An action surely
 deserves punishment, he says, 'which every body who hears of it is
 angry with, and upon that account rejoices to see punished' (TMS, 70;
 my emphasis). Smith continues in this vein:
 When we see one man oppressed or injured by another, the sympathy which
 we feel with the distress of the sufferer seems to serve only to animate our f ellow-
 feeling with his resentment against the offender. We are rejoiced to see him at-
 tack his adversary in his turn, and eager and ready to assist him whenever he
 exerts himself for defence, or even for vengeance within a certain degree. (TMS,
 70-1)
 These retributivist sentiments are give full vent by Smith when he turns
 to consider our reaction to murder and our sympathy with the victim.
 Oxford University Press 1978); abbreviated as LJ. Smith states (TMS, 77): 'Let
 it be considered too, that the present inquiry is not concerning a matter of right,
 if I may say so, but concerning a matter of fact. We are not at present examining
 upon what principles a perfect being would approve of punishment of bad ac-
 tions; but upon what principles so weak and imperfect a creature as man actual-
 ly and in fact approves of it/
 27 In general, on Smith's account we sympathize with another person when we im-
 aginatively place ourselves in his position and feel what he feels (i.e. we find that
 our sentiments 'correspond' with those of the person involved). In these circum-
 stances we regard his sentiments as proper or appropriate to their object, and
 thus we approve of them.
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 We feel that resentment which we imagine he ought to feel. . . . His blood we think
 calls aloud for vengeance. The very ashes of the dead seem to be disturbed at the
 thought that his injuries are to pass unrevenged.... And with regard, at least,
 to this most dreadful of all crimes, Nature, antecedent to all reflections upon the utili-
 ty of punishment, has in this manner stamped upon the human heart, in the strongest
 and most indelible characters, an immediate and instinctive approbation of the sacred and
 necessary law of retaliation. (TMS, 71; my emphasis)
 In light of passages such as this, it would be hard to overstate the
 strength of Smith's (positive) retributivism. The contrast with Hume,
 in this respect, is perfectly clear.
 While Smith, unlike Hume, rejects any role for forward-looking con-
 sequentialist considerations in justifying punishment he, nevertheless,
 does not entirely overlook such considerations.28 A number of
 philosophers, he notes, have suggested that it is consideration of the
 public good which is 'the real source of the punishment of crimes.'29
 Smith, as we have seen, rejects this suggestion. However, he does ac-
 knowledge that there is an indirect connection between our retributive
 practices and the welfare of society. Indeed, Smith points out that there
 can be no doubt 'that we frequently have occasion to confirm our natu-
 ral sense of the propriety and fitness of punishment, by reflecting how neces-
 sary it is for preserving the order of society' (TMS, 88; cf . TMS, 77:
 'The very existence of society. . .'). Nevertheless, be this as it may, 'The
 Author of nature,' Smith suggests, 'has not entrusted it' to man's rea-
 son to find out that a certain application of punishments is the proper
 means of attaining the welfare and preservation of society. In order
 to secure the preservation of society - an end which all men naturally
 desire - nature has not only 'endowed mankind with an appetite for
 the end which she proposes, but likewise with an appetite for the means
 by which alone this end can be brought about, for their own sakes, and in-
 dependent of their tendency to produce it' (TMS, 77; my emphasis). In other
 words, according to Smith we naturally and instinctively approve of
 those punishments which secure an end which we also, independently,
 28 Smith's views on this issue, it should be noted, are not entirely uniform. More
 specifically, Smith does say that on some occasions "we both punish and approve
 of punishment, merely from a view to the general interest of society, which, we im-
 agine, cannot be otherwise secured' (TMS, 90; my emphasis, and also LJ, 105).
 It is not entirely obvious, however, how we are supposed to interpret such ex-
 ceptional cases; nor how Smith's remarks in this direction square with his analy-
 sis of the standard case. On this see Raphael, 'Hume and Adam Smith', 96-7.
 29 LJ, 104. Here Smith probably has Hume primarily in mind - although it is 'Grotius
 and other writers' to whom he actually refers. See the editors' remarks at TMS,
 87-8.
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 desire: viz. the welfare of society. On this basis, Smith argues that 're-
 venge of the injured' will 'regulate' our practice of punishment in such
 a way that it (indirectly) secures precisely those ends (i.e. deterrence,
 reform, etc.) which philosophers such as Hume have mistakenly sug-
 gested are the source of our 'original interest' in the punishment of
 crimes (LJ, 105; TMS, 89).30
 It seems clear that despite their obvious similarities there are,
 nevertheless, significant differences between Hume and Smith on the
 subject of punishment. There are three particularly important general
 points to be noted.
 1. Both thinkers are concerned to develop a theory of punishment on
 the basis of a naturalistic account of the moral sentiments. More spe-
 cifically, for both Hume and Smith it is crucial that we interpret the
 retributive features of punishment in terms of our moral sentiments.
 In this respect their approach to the problem of punishment is fun-
 damentally different from that of Hobbes and Schlick.
 2. Hume, following Hobbes, and unlike Smith, develops a 'mixed' or
 teleological retributivist theory of punishment. Both Hobbes and Hume
 are agreed that any adequate theory of punishment must appeal to
 utilitarian considerations as the general justifying aim of punishment.
 Neither, accordingly, would accept Smith's form of positive
 retributivism.
 3. Hume, along with both Hobbes and Smith, rejects any purely utilitar-
 ian approach to punishment. For all three thinkers there is an inelimina-
 ble retributive element involved in punishment.
 It seems clear, in light of these observations, that Hume's account
 of punishment differs in significant respects from both that of Hobbes
 and Smith. We may conclude, therefore, that Hume has a theory of
 punishment which is not only distinctive, but also far richer and more
 complex than has hitherto been recognized.31
 30 It may be noted that Smith's claims regarding the indirect utility of retributive prac-
 tices are highly questionable. That is, Smith claims that the law of retaliation'
 will effectively 'regulate' punishment in such a way that it indirectly secures our
 utilitarian ends (deterrence, reform, etc.). At least two difficulties arise for this
 claim: (a) in many cases such practices may serve no such ends - they may even
 be counter-productive; (b) from a utilitarian perspective there may be more effec-
 tive alternative strategies available to us.
 31 Within the confines of this paper it is not possible to explore the significance which
 this general interpretation of Hume's theory has for the more specific or narrow-
 er remarks that Hume makes on the subject of punishment. Two passages,
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 III
 In my introductory remarks I suggested that the most interesting as-
 pect of Hume's discussion, from a contemporary perspective, lies in
 his effort to develop a theory of punishment on naturalistic founda-
 tions (i.e. his effort to account for the role that moral sentiment plays
 in this sphere). The contemporary significance of this aspect of Hume's
 discussion can be better appreciated if we compare and contrast Hume's
 and Smith's views in light of more recent literature on this subject.
 Behind the specific issues separating Hume and Smith lies the deeper
 and wider problem of how we are to understand the relationship be-
 tween responsibility and punishment. Both Hume and Smith, as I have
 indicated, are agreed that punishment must be understood as resting
 upon, or developing out of, the fabric of our moral sentiments. Be-
 yond this, however, there is deep disagreement about how we should
 interpret the implications of a naturalistic theory of responsibility for
 the problem of punishment. This is an issue which has recently resur-
 faced in a particularly prominent context: namely, in the context of
 Strawson's highly influential statement of the naturalistic approach to
 responsibility.32 The similarities between Hume's and Strawson's
 however, merit brief comment: (1) At T,608-9 Hume, notoriously, suggests that
 natural abilities and moral qualities are 'on the same footing' as regards their ten-
 dency to arouse moral sentiments in us. In other words, according to Hume peo-
 ple are held accountable or responsible for both. There is, nevertheless, he
 suggests, a distinction to be drawn between them in so far as our moral qualities,
 but not our natural abilities, 'may be chang'd by the motives of rewards and punish-
 ments, praise and blame.' Clearly there is much in this account to question. How-
 ever, Hume's position on this more specific issue is, I suggest, more intelligible
 when considered within the framework of his general theory of punishment. (2)
 At EPM,322 - developing points raised from the passage at T,608-9 (taking issue,
 in particular, with the suggestion that the distinction between voluntary and in-
 voluntary be made the foundation of a theory of morals) - Hume objects to those
 philosophers and/or divines who treat 'all morals as on a like footing with civil
 laws, guarded by the sanctions or reward and punishment.' The general point
 that Hume is concerned with here is that it is crucial that we distinguish between
 situations where our moral sentiments have been legitimately aroused and cir-
 cumstances in which we are justified in distributing rewards and punishments
 on the basis of these sentiments. This fundamental point is firmly embedded in
 Hume's general theory of punishment. Indeed, it lies at the heart of his objec-
 tions to the theological doctrine of future rewards and punishments.
 32 'Freedom and Resentment,' reprinted in G. Watson, ed., Free Will (Oxford: Ox-
 ford University Press 1982), 59-80. See also Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism:
 Some Varieties, Ch.2. Unlike Hume (and Smith), Strawson speaks of 'reactive at-
 titudes and feelings.' He notes, however, that it is 'a pity that talk of the moral
 sentiments has fallen out of favour' as that phrase would be a 'good name' for
 the network of attitudes and feelings he is concerned with (79). It should also
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 naturalistic approach to responsibility are in many respects quite strik-
 ing. In general, the salient features of Hume's views on responsibili-
 ty, as described above, reappear in Strawson's account. Strawson's
 remarks regarding the implications of his views for the problem of
 punishment are, nevertheless, both brief and obscure.33 More specifi-
 cally, as it stands, it is unclear whether his remarks should be inter-
 preted as lending support to a form of positive retributivism, along
 the lines of Smith, or, alternatively, to a form of teleological retributi-
 vism along the lines of Hume. If it is the former theory which Strawson
 is embracing then it may be argued, for reasons which I will explore,
 that such an account is not satisfactory. More generally, it may be ar-
 gued that until it is shown that a naturalistic account of responsibility
 can be rendered consistent with a plausible theory of punishment then
 such an account remains suspect.34 In this way, it seems clear that the
 issues which separate Hume and Smith reappear at the very heart of
 Strawson's discussion. Granted the contemporary importance of
 Strawson's views on this subject we cannot, I suggest, afford to over-
 look Hume's and Smith's rival positions on this matter.35
 be noted in this context that Strawson's paper is in large measure a critique or
 attack upon Schlickean, 'forward-looking' accounts of responsibility and
 punishment.
 33 'Savage or civilized/ Strawson claims, 'we have some belief in the utility of the
 practices of condemnation and punishment ...' (78). For Strawson, however, this
 is not the central issue. Rather, the point which Strawson is concerned to estab-
 lish is that 'to speak in terms of social utility alone is to leave out something vital
 in our conception of these practices' (viz. our moral sentiments).
 34 Even though Strawson's paper has generated a great deal of comment and criti-
 cism very little has been said about the problem of punishment as it arises for
 him. Instead, commentators have focused their attention, almost exclusively, on
 the narrower issues of freedom and responsibility. This situation is particularly
 surprising in light of the fact that Smith (in whose footsteps Strawson clearly fol-
 lows) devotes a great deal of his attention to the problem of punishment. It is
 fair to say, I believe, that this is indicative of the extent to which Strawson's
 naturalistic theory of responsibility has been cut off from its historical roots.
 35 While Humes views on the subject ot punishment have received little attention
 over the years Smith's naturalistic account of positive retributivism has, by con-
 trast, succeeded in attracting a number of followers. The most important of these
 have been Edward Westermark, Ethical Relativity (London: Kegan Paul 1932;
 reprinted Westport, CT: Greenwood 1970); see esp. Ch. 3, and, more recently,
 John Mackie, 'Morality and the Retributive Emotions,' reprinted in Persons and
 Values (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985), 206-19. The Smithian flavour of
 Mackie's general position is quite obvious - indeed, it can be directly traced to
 Smith via Westermarck. In order to preserve the coherence and direction of my
 own discussion, however, I will continue to focus attention on Smith's views.
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 My analysis of the contrast between Hume's and Smith's views will
 focus on two closely related issues: (i) the relationship between moral
 sentiments and the justification of punishment; and (ii) the relation-
 ship between retributive practices and the will.
 (i) Hume, along with Smith, takes the view that it is impossible to
 develop a convincing or plausible 'forward-looking' or consequential
 rationale for our moral sentiments. That is, both are agreed that our
 moral sentiments are essentially retrospective in nature. Moreover, both
 are agreed that such sentiments arise naturally and spontaneously in
 reaction to the perceived moral qualities of another person.36 Howev-
 er, Hume also maintains, contrary to Smith's view, that a wholly
 'backward-looking' or retributive account of punishment would be equal-
 ly inadequate and implausible. The rationale of punishment, it is ar-
 gued, raises separate issues from those which arise solely within the
 framework of our moral sentiments. That is to say, there exists what
 may be described as a 'justificatory gap' between our moral sentiments
 and our practice of punishment. The only way to bridge this gap is
 by taking note of the relevance of forward-looking, consequentialist
 considerations.
 Where, according to Hume, does this 'justificatory gap' arise? Fun-
 damental to Smith's position, as we have noted, is the claim that in
 blaming an individual (i.e. regarding him as an appropriate object of
 resentment) we inevitably or necessarily approve of the infliction of
 punishment upon that individual. In other words, according to Smith,
 if our sentiments of blame or resentment are appropriate and suitable
 to their object, then so too are those actions of punishment which are
 motivated by these sentiments. Punishment, it appears, requires no
 36 Without going too deeply into the complexities of Hume's system two further
 points should be noted: (1) Some of Hume's remarks may be interpreted as sug-
 gesting that our moral sentiments are incapable of justification (e.g. T, 413-18,
 455-70). Nevertheless, Hume makes it clear that our moral sentiments, like other
 passions, may be said to be indirectly reasonable or unreasonable, justified or un-
 justified, in so far as they arise out of true or false beliefs. (On the role of reason
 in morals see esp. EPM, Sect. 1.) (b) The beliefs which generate or give rise to
 the moral sentiments concern the supposed pleasurable or painful qualities of
 mind or character of the individual in question. Hume suggests that it is our ex-
 pectations about the tendencies of an individual's character which shape or condi-
 tion our moral sentiments. The grounds of such expectations are inevitably rooted
 in our past experience and knowledge of the action and behaviour of the individual.
 The crucial point, however, is that our moral sentiments are not to be justified
 in terms of their future consequences or utility. Whether or not such sentiments
 are of utility they will naturally arise in the relevant circumstances (see, e.g., EPM,
 273 and 322). In this sense they are neither capable of, nor require, a consequen-
 tialist rationale.
This content downloaded from 142.103.160.110 on Mon, 27 Aug 2018 05:42:37 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 556 Paul Russell
 further or independent justification than that which is already presup-
 posed in viewing someone as a reasonable or appropriate object of
 blame or resentment. It is, therefore, a mistake to seek to provide some
 further or independent justification for inflicting punishment beyond
 reference to the appropriate or suitable nature of those sentiments
 which motivate such actions. Resentment and retribution, on this ac-
 count, come in one indivisible package. To regard resentment as justi-
 fied and appropriate is, ipso facto, to regard punishment as justified
 and appropriate.
 It is precisely at this stage that Hume rejects Smith's model. It sim-
 ply does not follow from the fact that our sentiments of blame or resent-
 ment are justified that we are therefore justified in intentionally
 inflicting suffering or pain on the individual(s) concerned.37 The
 backward-looking, retributive considerations which serve to justify our
 moral sentiments cannot, of themselves, bridge this gap. At the very
 least, therefore, we require some further argument here to show how,
 or why, such considerations can be 'extended' to cover the further issue
 of punishment. Simply to make reference to the 'necessary law of retali-
 ation' (TMS, 71, 82), or to the principle of 'returning evil for evil done'
 (TMS, 68), is either to provide no further justification at all, or, worse
 still, to misrepresent such practices as psychologically or practically
 speaking inescapable features of human life.38
 This 'gap' in Smith's account of punishment is most apparent when
 we focus attention on the institution or practice of punishment taken
 as a whole. That is to say, the obvious question to raise at this junc-
 ture is: Why should society spend its energies and resources on con-
 structing and maintaining institutions and practices of this nature?
 Smith's response here, such as it is, seems sorely inadequate. In
 37 Regarding the relationship between blame and punishment see, e.g., J.E.R.
 Squires, 'Blame/ reprinted in H.B. Acton, ed., The Philosophy of Punishment (Lon-
 don: MacMillan 1969), 204-11; and Richard Wasserstrom, 'Some Problems in the
 Definition and Justification of Punishment/ in A.I. Goldman and J. Kim, eds.,
 Values and Morals (Dortrecht & Boston: Reidel 1978), 307-8. (Wasserstrom, I note
 in passing, raises several interesting objections against the sort of 'mixed' or teleo-
 logical retributivist theory of punishment which I attribute to Hume. Suffice it
 to say, in this context, that I am not persuaded that his objections tell against
 Hume's position.)
 38 Consider the following tale told about Zeno of Citium, a necessitarian, by Di-
 ogenes Laertius: 'We are told that [Zeno] was once chastising a slave for steal-
 ing, and when the latter pleaded that it was his fate to steal, "Yes, and to be beaten
 too," said Zeno' (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 2 vols. [Lon-
 don: 1925], Vol.2, 135). In many respects, Smith's general position seems to be
 akin to that of Zeno.
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 respect of this issue it is wholly unconvincing to be told that the sole
 point or purpose of punishment is simply that it implements the 'neces-
 sary law of retaliation' and ensures that we return 'evil for evil done.'
 So described, punishment has no point or value at all.39 Smith's
 efforts to account for the indirect utility of such practices, it may be
 argued, indicate that he is himself aware of the 'gap' in his ac-
 count. This appeal to considerations of indirect utility is, however,
 beside the point. As I have already noted, it is according to Smith
 irrelevant, from a justificatory point of view, that our retributive prac-
 tices turn out to be of (indirect) utility. Clearly, therefore, Smith and
 his followers remain entirely committed to the view that such institu-
 tions and practices are just and proper irrespective of their consequences.^
 Seen from the perspective of Hume's alternative views on this sub-
 ject, however, this claim, so presented, is highly suspect. It is suspect
 because, as I have suggested, it leaves the 'justificatory gap' entirely
 unbridged.
 Hume's complex theory of punishment makes it possible for us to
 see our way past an apparent paradox in this sphere. On the face of
 it there appears to be a conflict or tension between the fundamental
 tenets of naturalistic theory of responsibility and the claim that punish-
 ment requires a teleological element in its justification. More specifi-
 cally, there appears to be a conflict between: (a) the claim - as
 expressed by Strawson - that 'the whole framework' of our moral sen-
 timent requires no 'external rational justification' (as it is a 'given' of
 our human nature regarding which we have no choice); and (b) the
 claim - as expressed by Hart - that punishment requires some ade-
 quate 'general justifying aim' (as it is not a 'given' of human nature
 39 Smith may be understood to be suggesting - in a more utilitarian vein - that
 the point of punishment is that it gratifies our desire for retribution. This line
 is pursued by James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (Cambridge:
 Cambridge University Press 1967 [1873]), 152. Stephen argues that common crimes
 are punished, 'not only because they are dangerous to society, but also for the
 sake of gratifying the feeling of hatred - call it revenge, resentment or what you
 will ....'It follows, Stephen suggests, that the criminal law is 'an emphatic asser-
 tion of the principle that the feeling of hatred and the desire for vengeance ...
 are important elements of human nature which ought in such cases to be satis-
 fied in a regular public and legal manner/
 40 Consider, for example, the theological implications of Smith's account, and how
 it contrasts with Hume's position. That is, granted the ontology presupposed in
 the doctrine of a future state, Smith cannot follow Hume in regarding the exis-
 tence of Hell as a barbarism without point or purpose. Indeed, Smith takes quite
 the opposite view. See TMS, 91 and 163f . (Although Smith would grant, no doubt,
 that Hell involves the excessive punishment of the guilty.)
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 and is, thus, a matter over which we do have choice).41 Smith and his
 followers would eliminate this apparent tension by rejecting the sug-
 gestion that punishment requires some general justifying aim. From
 their perspective our retributive practices, no less than the whole frame-
 work of our moral sentiments, are a given of human nature and, as
 such, are neither capable of nor require any 'external rational justifica-
 tion/42 Hume's complex theory succeeds, I believe, in providing us with
 a more satisfactory solution to this problem. By drawing a sharper dis-
 tinction between our moral sentiments and our retributive practices,
 and by offering an alternative account of the relations between them,
 the complex theory enables us to explain how it is that consequentialist
 considerations are called for with regard to the latter but not the form-
 er. That is, while it is essential, on this account, that punishment be
 justified in terms of consequences, no such rationale is required for
 the framework of our moral sentiments. Clearly, once these points are
 established, it is possible to reconcile the prima facie conflicting de-
 mands of a naturalistic account of responsibility with a teleological ele-
 ment in the justification of punishment. In general, an understanding
 of the significance of this gap between our moral sentiments and our
 retributive practices is crucial if we are to avoid drawing the mistaken
 conclusion that a naturalistic theory of responsibility necessarily com-
 mits us to some strong form of positive retributivism.
 (ii) Our analysis of the 'justificatory gap' between blame (resentment)
 and punishment reveals a further point of disagreement between Hume
 and Smith. Lying behind their divergent views on the justificatory issue
 is a more fundamental disagreement concerning moral psychology. It
 is disagreement at this level which explains their more obvious dis-
 agreement at the level of justification. Smith's position involves two
 distinct, but intertwined, claims. First, as has been noted, Smith claims
 that punishment may be justified without reference to its consequences.
 Second, Smith also suggests - although this claim is not so clearly
 developed - that punishment is embedded in our human nature in
 such a way that we are left, in some important sense, with no choice
 on the matter. That is to say, Smith speaks of punishment as the 'nat-
 ural consequence of resentment' (TMS, 79) and thus as something
 which is (for us), in the relevant circumstances, a practical or psycho-
 logical necessity. In other words, for Smith retributive practices are,
 41 Strawson, Treedom and Resentment', 78-9; Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, 8-11
 42 lhis theme is pursued in some detail in Mackie, Morality and the Retributive
 Emotions/
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 in some sense, 'built into' our human nature. 'As every man doth, so
 shall it be done to him, and retaliation seems to be the great law which
 is dictated to us by nature' (TMS, 83; my emphasis). This claim allows
 for two quite different interpretations. On the strong interpretation
 Smith may be read as arguing that in respect of our will our retribu-
 tive practices are on the same footing as our (reactive) moral sentiments.
 That is, Smith may be understood to be claiming that our retributive
 practices are essentially involuntary or spontaneous in the sense that
 they are not a matter of decision or choice at all. A few of Smith's re-
 marks lend themselves to this interpretation, perhaps, but on the whole
 it is clear that this (self-evidently implausible) view is not what he has
 in mind.43
 On the weak interpretation Smith may be taken to acknowledge or
 recognize that our retributive practices are indeed voluntary and, in
 some measure, depend on our choices or willings. That is, our retribu-
 tive practices, on this account, are a matter of deliberation and choice
 in a way that our moral sentiments clearly are not. However, the scope
 for deliberation is, nevertheless, severely limited. In this respect Smith
 draws a useful analogy between our desire for retaliation and other
 'original and immediate instincts' such as our desire for food, water
 and sex (TMS, 77-8). The general point of this analogy seems to be
 that our natural desire for retaliation is so fundamental to our human
 nature that it inevitably shapes our will and leads to action. It is in-
 conceivable, in other words, given our human nature, that these desires
 could be rendered 'inert' in actual practice. While there may be some
 scope for choice in shaping and directing these practices there is, on this
 account, no question of us suspending or abandoning these practices
 altogether. Such practices, it is suggested, are simply too deeply embed-
 ded in our human nature for such an option to arise. Clearly this view
 of things blocks all proposals to eliminate - or even radically reform
 - our practice of punishment (i.e. on the ground that given our human
 nature such proposals are impracticable). In short, Smith is understood,
 on this account, to be arguing that we can no more choose to suspend
 or abandon our retributive practices as a whole than we can choose
 to abandon the whole framework of our moral sentiments. On the con-
 trary, our natural human commitment to the latter ensures that we
 43 Implausible as this strong view may be, several of Mackie's comments ('Morality
 and the Retributive Emotions/ 216-19) lend themselves to this interpretation. In
 general, Mackie blurs the distinction between retaliating without a view to con-
 sequences and retaliating spontaneously or instinctively without making any 'con-
 scious choice' on the matter.
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 are inescapably committed to the former. Hence, within this sphere
 there are natural limits to what we may decide or choose to do.44
 The point at which Hume and Smith differ regarding the relation be-
 tween the will and our retributive practices should now be quite clear.
 From a Humean perspective Smith's model of the way in which the prac-
 tice of punishment is embedded in human nature substantially mis-
 represents the facts. The crucial point here is not simply that practices
 of this nature involve the intentional infliction of suffering and pain and
 hence must be chosen - this, as I have indicated, is a point which Smith
 can concede (i.e. on the weaker interpretation). Rather, the crucial point,
 from a Humean perspective, is that our commitment to the whole frame-
 work of the moral sentiments is not such that it is psychologically or prac-
 tically impossible for us to free ourselves of retributive practices. That
 is to say, however natural retributive feelings and desires may be, we
 have no reason to regard our will as dominated and controlled by them.
 On the contrary, it is the sign of a civilized and humane mind (or socie-
 ty) that such retributive impulses are controlled and curbed in such a
 way that we can ensure that they serve only socially desirable ends.45
 Where they do not serve or secure such ends they must be checked, and
 to that extent suspended or abandoned where necessary. This differ-
 ence in our practical situation in respect of punishment accounts for the
 fact that it requires a further level of justification (and that it is at this level
 that consequentialist or forward-looking considerations come into play).
 Above all, from a practical point of view we may not regard ourselves
 as Victims' of our own moral sentiments. While we do not choose our
 moral sentiments, we do choose whom, and when, to punish. In this
 respect we stand in an utterly different position in relation to the prac-
 tice of punishment than we do to our essentially spontaneous or in-
 voluntary emotional reactions to the moral qualities of other people.
 There is, then, on this account, sufficient scope for us to choose to sus-
 pend or abandon our retributive practices in circumstances where we
 can see that they secure no socially desirable ends.
 44 So described, Smith's position may be (loosely) interpreted in terms of Harry Frank-
 furt's account of free will ('Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person/
 in Watson, ed., Free Will). That is, our desire for retaliation is such that whatever
 our reflective attitude may be with respect to these desires they will nevertheless
 be effective in leading to action. In other words, it is impossible for us to restruc-
 ture our will in such a way that our resentment does not lead to retaliation or
 retribution. We cannot alter or change our will in this respect. This is consistent
 with the (obvious) fact that retaliatory actions are done of our own will and thus
 we enjoy freedom of action in respect of them.
 45 dearly, for Hume, someone who is willing to intentionally inflict pain and suffering
 for no purpose other than vengeance is simply vicious.
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 I believe that there is much to be said for this Humean reply to Smith.
 Nevertheless, I have one or two reservations which I will briefly de-
 scribe. First, even if we concede that it is possible for us to 'check' our
 desire for retaliation in light of utilitarian considerations, such a policy
 seems to encourage and condone widespread hypocrisy and insinceri-
 ty. That is to say, if we are constantly deciding whether or not to express
 our moral sentiments, in word or deed, on the basis of (forward-looking)
 utilitarian considerations then it seems clear that we will frequently have
 reason not to express our true or sincere sentiments towards one anoth-
 er. In these circumstances, while our moral sentiments will be condi-
 tioned by backward-looking considerations, our actual treatment of the
 individuals who are the objects of these sentiments will be shaped (at
 least in part) by forward-looking considerations. This discrepancy be-
 tween, on the one hand, the way we think and feel about one another
 and, on the other hand, the way we treat one another - if it is livable
 - will require a considerable loss of spontaneity. Moreover, on the basis
 of such a policy we may find ourselves treating individuals in inconsis-
 tent ways. For example, in certain circumstances utilitarian considera-
 tions may dictate that we punish some individuals for relatively minor
 failings while other individuals, whom we more strongly disapprove
 of, go unpunished (because punishment would serve no further pur-
 pose in their case). Similarly, we may find that two individuals who are
 the objects of similar negative moral sentiments should nevertheless be
 treated differently in respect of punishment because it will be of utility
 to punish one but not the other. Such circumstances may be unlikely
 or improbable, perhaps, but it is equally clear that they could well arise.
 In short, it may be argued that even if we concede to Hume that it is pos-
 sible to curb our retributive practices in the way that he suggests, we
 will, nevertheless, have to pay a high price for such a policy in terms
 of hypocrisy, insincerity and inconsistency. We should be reluctant, the
 critic may argue, to allow such a large discrepancy between our thought
 and action, feeling and practice, to develop.
 Second, the critic may continue to be unconvinced by the Humean
 account of the relation between retributive practices and the will. That
 is, it remains far from obvious that it is possible to disengage our (natu-
 ral) retributive feelings and desires from retributive practices in the way
 that Hume's theory presupposes. It is possible, perhaps, for some (few)
 individuals to master their retributive sentiments and desires in such
 a way that they could abandon or suspend their retributive practices.
 (We may view such individuals as 'Spinozists' in practice, if not in
 thought.) Similarly, it is possible that all of us are, in some measure,
 capable of checking or curbing our retributive practices. Nevertheless,
 it is quite another thing to suggest that we are all (or even a sizable
 minority of us) capable of entirely suspending or abandoning our
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 retributive practices. Granted that our moral sentiments are inescapa-
 ble features of human life, it is, surely, demanding too much of human
 nature to claim that we could - despite this burden - simply suspend
 or abandon our retributive practices if we so choose. Our moral senti-
 ments and our retributive practices are too closely bound up with each
 other for that to be possible. Considerations of this general nature, it
 may be argued, suggest that the psychological foundations of Hume's
 complex theory of punishment are themselves suspect.
 It seems clear, in light of the foregoing analysis, that both Hume and
 Smith encounter difficulties with their naturalistic approach to the prob-
 lem of punishment. Moreover, as it stands, it is not evident that ei-
 ther strategy can overcome all of the difficulties which lie in their
 respective paths. In several respects, as I have indicated, Hume's the-
 ory is both more plausible and more satisfactory than Smith's (strong)
 positive retributivism. Nevertheless, whatever the merits of Hume's
 account, there remains a serious tension between the claim that we
 are naturally and inescapably committed to our moral sentiments and
 the supposition that we may suspend or abandon our retributive prac-
 tices where and when they prove to be of no social utility. Moreover,
 it may also be argued that whatever the shortcomings in Smith's ac-
 count, at least it does not license a radical discrepancy between our
 moral evaluations of people and the way that we treat them. Clearly,
 then, difficulties arise for Hume as well as Smith.
 Those thinkers who wish to take a naturalistic approach to the prob-
 lem of responsibility along the lines of Strawson should pause to con-
 sider the difficulties that Hume and Smith run into in this sphere. In
 particular, they should ask themselves where Strawson stands on these
 issues. Would he, for example, accept the Humean view that there ex-
 ists a 'justificatory gap' between our moral sentiments and our retribu-
 tive practices - or would he follow Smith in rejecting this claim?
 Similarly, would Strawson accept the Humean view that our retribu-
 tive practices, unlike our moral sentiments, are not inescapable features
 of human life? All this remains unclear. Finally, as I have suggested,
 it may be argued that if it is indeed impossible to reconcile a naturalis-
 tic approach to responsibility with a credible and coherent theory of
 punishment then we have, on the face of it, strong grounds for reject-
 ing such an approach. It is, accordingly, crucial that those who find
 merit in Strawson's discussion give further consideration to the rival
 strategies which Hume and Smith provide us with.
 IV
 My first objective in this paper has been to articulate and describe the
 nature and character of Hume's theory of punishment. There are, I
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 claim, two particularly notable features of Hume's discussion. First,
 Hume's theory of punishment rests on the foundations of a naturalis-
 tic theory of moral responsibility. Second, on the basis of this naturalis-
 tic foundation, Hume develops a 'mixed' or teleological retributivist
 account of punishment. These two elements of Hume's theory serve
 to distinguish his position from, on the one hand, those of Hobbes
 and Schlick, and on the other hand, from those of Smith and his fol-
 lowers. So interpreted, Hume's theory of punishment is, I have ar-
 gued, not only distinctive, but also far richer and more complex than
 has hitherto been recognized. The historical significance of this con-
 clusion is, I take it, quite self-evident.
 My second objective has been to show that the contemporary interest
 of Hume's discussion lies primarily with his naturalistic approach to
 the problem of punishment. In particular, I have argued that Hume's
 discussion brings to light a number of interesting and important prob-
 lems for Strawson's influential (and rather similar) naturalistic account
 of responsibility. In more general terms, Hume's attempt to interpret
 the implications of a naturalistic theory of responsibility for the prob-
 lem of punishment, I maintain, sheds considerable light on the wider
 issue concerning the relationship between responsibility and punish-
 ment.46 Within this general framework Hume's contribution is, I sug-
 gest, as illuminating as it is distinctive. Given that Hume's views on
 this subject have been largely overlooked, this is a conclusion of some
 consequence.47
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 Revised: April 1990
 46 This issue - along with others closely related to it - is discussed and analysed
 in an interesting fashion by Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton in Forgiveness and
 Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988). It is worth noting that
 Hume's complex theory of punishment provides an interesting point of contrast
 and criticism from which to judge and evaluate Murphy's and Hampton's (diver-
 gent) contributions to the contemporary debate. It may also be argued, from an-
 other perspective, that the interpretation and analysis of Hume's discussion
 provided here reveals the extent to which Hume anticipated - and perhaps in-
 directly shaped - some of the more interesting recent developments in this sphere.
 47 For helpful suggestions, remarks, and/or discussions concerning various aspects
 of this paper (early drafts of which date back to 1983) I would like to thank Cora
 Diamond, Ross Harrison, John Marshall, Neil MacCormick, Bernard Williams and,
 particularly, D.D. Raphael and the editor and referees for the CJP: David Copp,
 Annette Baier and Marcia Baron. I would also like to thank audiences at Virginia,
 Chicago and Stanford for their comments on a paper of related interest. The final
 draft of this paper was prepared while I held a Mellon Fellowship at Stanford
 University.
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